Situated between the decline of the obsolete privilege system and the rise of copyright, literary borrowing in the eighteenth century has long been characterized as unregulated. However, studying the production and consumption of eighteenth-century fan fiction -literary works written by readers who appropriate characters invented by other authors -reveals that such appropriations were actually governed by a set of unwritten customary laws. This paper situates fan fiction and its rules within the larger intellectual property debate of the eighteenth century. In addition to identifying fictional characters as a special form of communal property, this paper redefines the "literary commons" of eighteenth-century Germany. Understanding how fan fiction fits into the history of intellectual property ultimately reveals an overlooked history of moral rights in literary works and compels a reevaluation of the concept of literary property.
to an expected practice by 1780, such that critics could anticipate its arrival in the wake of a popular novel. Eighteenth century readers wrote fan fiction in a variety of forms, including sequels, prequels, spin-offs, alternative universe stories, stories from substitute perspectives. By the end of the century, fan fiction was everywhere.
Although fan fiction was written across Europe, Germany is perhaps the richest source of contemporary ideas and attitudes about the writing practice. Unlike France and England, the German-speaking lands were a legal quagmire. Consisting of some 300 territories, each with its own laws and unable or unwilling to enforce the laws of neighboring territories, the German states could not hope to resolve early disputes about literary borrowings in the legal arena alone. 7 The resulting intellectual property debate was carried out by philosophers and legal scholars as well as authors and literary critics. 8 In addition to a wider range of voices contributing to the discussion, the debate in Germany was more expansive than in neighboring countries. In England and France, the discussion about intellectual property was often confined to the facts of litigated cases and was circumscribed by existing statutory language. 9 In comparison (and by necessity), Germans could think more freely and about more problems related to intellectual property.
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The result is a profound discourse about literary appropriations and an embedded system of customary laws governing the spread of literary ideas.
In this period, the concept of "intellectual property" first emerged. And by the final decades of the century, German philosophers and jurists sought to define the rights in a literary work as a unique form of property. The famed publisher Georg Joachim Göschen asked "under what legal conditions" authors, publishers, and book dealers "should deal." 11 Knigge sought to define the "duties, judgments, and rights of the author." 12 Mendelssohn contemplated how far "the property right in a work of the mind stretched." 13 Others wanted to define "commerce in intellectual products." 14 And, most famously, Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte weighed in on the debate. In the process, contemporaries discussed the propriety of a wide variety of writing practices, from piracy and plagiarism to excerpting and translation. As early as 1785, Wieland observed that "for a long time, there has been no more problematic matter, about which right or wrong depends, that has been precisely and thoroughly examined than the question of the property right of writers to their works…." 15 Everyone, it seemed, was discussing intellectual property.
In particular, the eighteenth-century debate centered on piracy. By 1793 the topic was so widely discussed, one author in the Braunschweigisches Journal suggested there was nothing left to say on the matter.
The questions of the legality or illegality, justice or injustice, usefulness or harmfulness of the piracy of widely-read books have, for some time, occupied a considerable number of our philosophers and jurists, and are, in fact, from so many sides and with such completeness discussed, that one could now well see the case as closed without having to worry about any accusation of rashness.
16 11 "unter welchen rechtlichten Bedingunen" authors, publishers, and book dealers "handeln soll [en] ." Göschen, Georg Joachim. Given the importance of the piracy debate to the development of intellectual property, most scholarly attention has been devoted to this issue. However, in the shadow of the larger debate about what laws should govern the reproduction of literary works, German authors and thinkers engaged in a discussion about fan fiction. Studying this ancilliary debate provides an alternative view of the rise of intellectual property in Germany, revealing overlooked ideas about authors' rights that developed in the eighteenth century.
Meine Gedanken über den Buchhandel und über dessen Mängel, meine wenigen Erfahrungen und meine unmaßgeblichen
After briefly discussing the key concepts that emerged from the piracy debate, this paper argues that fan fiction was treated as a unique issue, the regulation of which compelled a distinct solution. This paper then analyzes eighteenth-century attitudes toward fictional characters as a special form of communal property, redefining the "literary commons" of eighteenth-century Germany. Finally, it briefly evaluates the ways in which this commons balanced the competing interests at stake in the intellectual property debate. Understanding how fan fiction fits into the history of intellectual property in Germany ultimately compels a reevaluation of the concept of literary property and the history of moral rights.
Ideas, Expressions, and the Foundation of Moral Rights
Although intellectual property was hotly contested in the eighteenth century, several influential ideas were widely accepted by the end of the century. Authors became vested with legal capacity, capable of holding rights based on the creation of a text. And authors' rights were progressively considered a form of intellectual property right. 17 While scholars today dispute the motivation for this shift in the concept of the "author" -variously suggesting political, aesthetic, and economic motives -it is clear that the final decades of the eighteenth century mark an epistemological new beginning for the concept of the author. Johann Stephan Pütter that resulted in the emergence of the author's "Eigentumsrecht" which enabled the author to claim legal rights in her literary output. 20 Instead of dwelling on the historical development of these rights, this paper focuses on how this evolution led to the delineation of distinctive proprietary interests in literature, arguably the most important of which was the differentiation between the physical book from its content.
The influential Göttingen law professor Johann Stephan Pütter argued in 1774 that the purchaser of a book could do anything he wanted with it: "read, review, gift, borrow, pledge, resell for more or less, exchange; yes, he may tear, cut, burn it, or use it however he likes; in this way he uses the right of his property without infringing on the rights of any other." 21 Pütter emphasizes that the buyer himself holds a property right in the book, but Pütter limits that right to the physical, material object. This distinction became common in discussions of intellectual property rights. Reich, for istance, formulated it as the that the author emerges as an expression of a political, aesthetic, and epistemological new beginning and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."
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A Matter of "Billigkeit"
As eighteenth-century thinkers sought to define the rights of an author in her text, they also debated the best method for securing and enforcing those rights. Summarizing the prevailing question about piracy, the anonymous author of the 1793 essay "On the Property of Thoughts" ["Ueber das Eigenthum der
Gedanken"] asked: "if it is right and good for this activity to be declared a crime through a positive law?" 44 The same question was debated with regard to fan fiction, but resulted in a different answer.
Many bemoaned the lack of statutory laws governing the relationship between readers, authors, publishers, and book dealers. "It belongs unfortunately to the shortcomings of our legislation," Wieland capture a sheep than a wolf, should the latter remain free?" 49 Krause questions why one matter should be left to law and the other to an individual's honor. Like the specification of the "positive law" ["positives
Gesetz"] in Wieland's complaint, Krause's criticism hints at the existence of multiple regulatory schemes, including both the positive law and customary norms, which could be used to govern intellectual property.
As the century progressed, the relationship between authors, publishers, and readers became increasingly formalized. 50 Where the positive law was not employed to define these new rights, actors in the book trade turned to private contracts and customary laws. In several instances, semi-juridical industry regulations were proposed as an alternative to state-sponsored laws. In 1804, leading publishers created a Most aspects of the book trade were governed instead by an unwritten customary law, what Bahrdt refers to "this stilent contract" 55 and Fichte describes as the "tacit contract of the writer." 56 Unlike the positive law, this silent contract was thought to be implicitly governed by the more general concept of "Billigkeit."
In the eighteenth century, as today, "Billigkeit" was an imprecise concept related to customary notions of justice and equity. 57 As
the 1804 treatise On the Equity of Decision of Legal Cases [Ueber Die Billigkeit
Bey Entscheidung Der Rechtsfälle] makes clear, legal decisions were to be guided by both the law and "Billigkeit," but the latter was a separate basis for adjudicating cases and it could lead to different results. 58 As a result, eighteenth-century thinkers regularly contrasted the positive law with "Billigkeit" in the debate about intellectual property rights. In the absence of positive law, it was especially common for authors and publishers to appeal to "Billigkeit" as a distinct concept and separate adjudicatory scheme.
Discussing piracy, the anonymous author of the essay "On the Property of Thoughts" ["Ueber das Eigenthum der Gedanken"], raises "the question of the legality or illegality, justice or injustice" of piracy, thus treating "Billigkeit" and legality ["Rechtmäßigkeit"] as a distinct concepts. 59 Klopstock similarly appealed to "Billigkeit" as the basis for deciding a contract dispute with the publisher Carl Hermann
Hemmerde -despite the positive law -urging that "according to Billigkeit the matter must be decided The law must must be determined once and for all, for every case, according to the general conditions and without reference to special circumstances, otherwise general uncertainty would result. However, because the boundaries of equity are unstable, it cannot be determined through the law, but must be left to the conscience and a fine consideration of the consequences. Billigkeit remains discretionary to the conscience of the private individual, and concerns actions where the borders of allowed and unallowed behavior are so uncertain, as every defender of the publishing-property admits in light of the remotemeness or the time and diverse other circumstances that can be no general law.
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In particular, Billigkeit was considered useful where the boundary between permitted and forbidden behavior was ambiguous. In such cases, the positive law was thought too blunt an instrument, unable to account for the complexities of literary production. The author concludes by noting that neither Kant nor
Pütter thoroughly discussed this question with regard to the "public communication of ideas."
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In the eighteenth century, the regulation of fan fiction was explicitly left to customary law as a better means of policing authors' newly emerging intellectual property rights. 68 In the myriad statutory schemes proposed, none suggest that fan fiction should be governed by the positive law. 
Characters as Communal Property
In the final decades of the eighteenth century, German thinkers resolved that ideas were the common property of all and that particular expressions thereof were the property of their authors. When it came to the unauthorized reproduction of entire works of literature, it was eventually settled that a positive law should forbid the practice. After all, piracy resulted in the appropriation not just of an author's ideas, but also their form. Characters, however, are vexingly situated between an idea and its expression. 71 As John
Frow describes, fictional characters are "ontologically hybrid beings," composed "of words, of images, of
imaginings." 72 Characters may amount to no more than a stock figure or common trope, but their appearance on the printed page is owed to the specific expression of an author. Yet even the most detailed character is still fleshed out and completed, to some extent, in the mind of a text's readers, making the character more akin to an idea. 73 Nevertheless, fictional characters were treated as ideas in the eighteenth century, rendering them common property. But rather than creating a statutory regulation, eighteenth-70 Fan fiction was not the only aspect of the book trade that was regulated by a system of customary law. Selwyn notes that respectable publishers, those who followed the governing norms, "joined together to fight their less law-abiding colleagues, or members of other branches of the book trade who overstepped legal or customary boundaries, but also took other measures to ensure a certain degree of peace within the trade." Selwyn continues, "[a]mong respectable booksellers, at least within the same city, it was considered proper to inquire whether one was intruding on any territory before undertaking a project involving works from another publisher's firm." As an example, Selwyn cites an incident from 1780, when the author Rudolph Zacharias Becker offered a manuscript answering the Berlin Academy's essay contest to Nicolai, who refused it. According to Nicolai, because his colleague Voß published the prize essays, it was improper for Nicolai to accept even the revised version offered by Becker. In addition, Selwyn notes that publishers also, for instance, regularly asked each other for permission to print excerpts from works printed by the other publisher, although no statutory law required securing such authorization. treatises, philosophical essays, advertisements, book reviews, and literary texts, the customary rules governing the production of fan fiction in eighteenth-century Germany have been similarly identified.
In eighteenth-century Germany, a reader could do anything she liked with a character originally invented by a foreign or deceased author. If the source author was still-living and German, however, additional rules applied to the fan fiction. The second norm stipulated that the fan fiction-writing reader would ideally ask the source author for permission before publishing the fan fiction -or, at least, give notice.
Authors of fan fiction were also expected to properly identify their works as fan fiction. Any attempt to confuse the reader into thinking that the work was written by the source author was strictly prohibited. The customary norms further governed the content of fan fiction. According to these rules, the appropriated character had to be portrayed consistently with its original depiction. That is, an appropriated literary figure was expected to have the same character in the work of fan fiction as in the source work.
Dramatic alterations of the character's personality were not tolerated. Just as characters were expected to demonstrate a unity of character within a text, a similar unity was required across texts -even if they were written by different authors. Relatedly, works of fan fiction were also required to conform to -or at least not undermine -the source author's overall artistic intent.
Just as an author's ideas were considered "communal property" [" their English counterparts, which frequently described characters as "kidnapped." 90 German characters, however, were rarely pronounced kidnapped in the sense of being stolen persons. Rather they are more accurately described by the alternative meaning of "bemächtigen" suggested by the Grimm dictionary: "to use or take advantage of," to "master" material.
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"Bemächtigen" also had a distinct legal connotation. Fichte utilizes the term repeatedly in "Proof of the 
Conditions on the Commons: Reconceptualizing the Literary Commons
Following Simon Stern, legal and literary scholars regularly refer to a "literary commons" when discussing the rise of intellectual property rights in the eighteenth century. 96 A "commons" refers to a resource held in common, free to be used by anyone within the relevant community. 97 As Lawrence Lessig puts it: "no one exercises the core of a property right with respect to these resources -the exclusive right to choose whether the resource is available to others." Because it is associated with the absence of an exclusive right to exclude, the literary commons is frequently equated with "free culture," 101 In his groundbreaking study, The Afterlife of Character, Brewer asserts that fictional characters, as part of this "textual commons," were treated as "the common property of all." 102 As a result, Brewer concludes, readers could use pre-existing characters however they liked, arguing that they "could feel free to invent whatever additional performance struck their fancy without having to worry that they were being unjust or larcenous." 103 He contends that such use of pre-existing charcters was governed by "no mortal law." 104 The only other studies of pre-twentieth-century fan fiction, Jamison's Fic and Judge's "Kidnapped and Counterfeit Characters," both follow Brewer's lead, characterizing the literary commons as entirely unregulated. 105 However, none of these studies relies on substantial empirical work or seriously considers the role of customary law.
Consequently, scholars of the eighteenth century tend to overlook that, even if all were welcome to "hunt on the commons," there might still have been rules regulating that use. 106 They regard the absence of a positive law as evidence of a lack of any regulation. Yet, tracing the rise of intellectual property through fictional characters suggests that this commons is different than scholarship characterizes. Indeed, the literary commons -at least in Germany -was regulated by a robust system of customary norms.
The act of writing fan fiction was not itself considered an invasion of an author's rights in her literary creation. There are scant suggestions that other authors were absolutely prohibited from using another author's literary character. In fact, there is plenty of evidence that fan fiction was expected, especially in the wak of a particularly successful novel.
In short, using the ideas of another author was permitted, including fictional characters. A character, though, had to be used properly, according to the rules of fan fiction discussed above. In his chapter on intellectual property and the "Rights of the Author" ["Rechte des Schriftstellers"], Rössig explains that an author can use the "material already presented by others," but only if it is "appropriately used." 107 Dusch similarly notes that using a pre-existing character presents no problem, "one can make an alreadydepicted character into his own," but adds a caveat that only "if it is properly done." 108 Eighteenth-century commentators regularly noted that fictional characters had to be used appropriately, that is, according to the rules that regulated the production of fan fiction in the late eighteenth century. Above all, these rules required second authors to portray borrowed characters consistently with their initial depiction. In this regard, writers of fan fiction were obliged to respect the artistic intent of the first author. The norms further required second authors to provide notice of their appropriation and prohibited them from presenting their spin-off texts in a manner that would exploit potential confusion about the author's identity.
Although these norms were limited to characters invented by still-living, German authors, Virgil is routinely cited as the shining example of how to appropriate a pre-existing character. Blanckenburg, for instance, lauds "the art, with which Virgil, among others, picks up the individual threads of the character of Aeneas from the great Homeric fabric, and brings it into an identically colors, thick, and complete piece through his additions, this deserves the highest praise of the strictest critics." 109 To describe Virgil's craft, Blanckenburg employs the same weaving metaphors common to descriptions of properly written fan fiction. Then, he offers a final lesson after severely critiquing Nicolai's portrayal of Sebaldus Nothanker (a character whom Nicolai appropriated from the poet Thümmel). 110 "Through the preceding investigation," Blackenburg expounds, "young poets should learn with how much care the connection to the whole must be handled, with how much attention to character and situation they should proceed…." 111 By citing Virgil as an example to be followed, Blanckenburg not only anticipates such appropriations in the future, he telegraphs their propriety. However, this "precise connection," the critic explains, can be demanded "mit Recht."
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If the rules were broken, the offending fan fiction author could be punished with a panoply of social enforcement mechanisms. Authors made unofficial complaints to officials in the book trade, coordinated negative reviews of transgressing works, placed advertisements discrediting offending fan fiction, wrote counteracting works and confrontational authors' notes. In some cases, authors even launched personal attacks on fan fiction authors in an attempt to ruin their literary careers. Wieland describes one such mechanism in his 1782 translation of Horace's Ars Poetica, updated for his eighteenth-century German audience. 113 After describing characters as "a material to which everyone has an equal right," Wieland notes that appropriators will follow certain rules, in part, due to their "fear of censure." 114 Merkel also declares that a first author, in the event of improper appropriation, could "vindiciren" the matter, introducing another legalistic term into the discussion about fan fiction. 115 According to Zedler's Universal Lexikon, "vindicieren" means, also in those rights, in part, to seek revenge, to punish, defend, shield, and also in part and more often, to arrogate something for oneself, to take make demands on a thing, to inhere in it, and to keep it and give it away as one's own, to hold in possession until it is discharged, or to bring the hypothecarian charge, and also not just the ownership of a thing, but also any other right, whichever one may claim, and to demand it from the possessor.
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In the context of fan fiction, "vindiciren" denotes not just punishment, but also protection. The first author can defend ("vertheidigen") and shield ("beschirmen") the character from the offending use. Moreover, Merkel's use of "vindiciren" implies a limitation on the right of second authors: if they misappropriated a fictional character, they could lose their right to that property. Characters, in other words, could be freely used as a "common good" ["Gemeingut"]. 117 But that use was subject to conditions, the transgression of which resulted in sanctioned punishment. With respect to fictional characters, the literary commons was governed by this set of customary norms and the limitations they imposed.
Accordingly, the eighteenth-century German literary commons departs from most scholarly accounts. It is a special kind of commons -one regulated by conditions. Under the system that developed in the late eighteenth century, readers were allowed to write fan fiction using fictional characters invented by other authors; after all, authors did not have an exclusive right to literary figures, which were considered common property. But these fictional characters had to be "bemächtigt" in the appropriate manner, that is, 115 Merkel, Briefe, p. 676. The concept of "vindicieren" is connected to property throughout the late-eighteenth century. The 1794 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten includes a title "Von Verfolgung des Eigenthums" with a section devoted to "Wer vindiciren könne." 116 "heist so wohl in denen Rechten . . . theils so viel, als rächen Rache suchen, eifern, straffen, vertheidigen, beschirmen, theils aber auch und gar öfters sich eines Dinges anmassen, eines Sache in Anspruch nehmen, sich dieselbe zueignen, für die seinige halten und ausgeben, bis zum Austrag der Sache in Besitz nehmen, oder die Hypothecarische Klage anstellen, und also nicht nur das Eigenthum einer Sache, sondern auch überhaupt ein jedwedes anders Recht, so man nur an derselben haben mag, zu behaupten suchen, und dieselbe ihren Besitzer wieder abfordern." Zedler, Johann H, and Johann P. Ludewig. following the rules of fan fiction. Otherwise, the second author could be punished. The extra-legal customary norms regulating fan fiction in the eighteenth century therefore functioned analogously to a limited licensing scheme resembling the creative commons of the internet era.
In the creative commons, a user can exploit "any work that has a Creative Commons license under the terms that the license specifies. The owner has, with that license, given [the user] blanket permission for some uses, and has also usually imposed some limitations." 118 The twenty-first century creative commons aims to modify the default of intellectual property rights. Instead of granting the author exclusive control, the creative commons permits free use with certain conditions. The literary commons of the eighteenth century made a similar gesture and reached a strikingly similar result, but began from a different starting point because no copyright or exclusive right yet existed. The customary norms of fan fiction transformed the default of the eighteenth-century literary commons. Instead of completely unconstrained use of preexisting characters, the use was subject to certain conditions. Unlike the creative commons licensing, of course, eighteenth-century authors did not individually specify the terms of those conditions. But, insofar as the rules embody customary norms, they did reflect the literary community's collective desires.
Balancing Interests
Governed by the conditions imposed by the rules of fan fiction, the eighteenth-century literary commons operated as a proto-intellectual property scheme that balanced the competing commercial, artistic, and public interests discussed in fan fiction. 121 Although there were many complaints about the economic harm caused by fan fiction, there was no clear rule that works that caused commercial competition were not allowed. However, the rules collectively mitigated against harms arising from commercial competition and brand dilution. Woks of fan fiction that styled themselves continuations as if they were written by the source author were not allowed. And these would have caused the most economic harm by occupying the exact same position on the market. Moreover, the rules about notice and permission meant that authors would have the opportunity to negotiate with fan fiction authors, possibly about retitling works. Additionally, ensuring that attribution was proper and that titles could not falsely style themselves continuations by the same author also protected this interest. In essence the rules forbid fan fiction from appearing under the same title -i.e. from claiming to be a continuation or a "second part" -without additional elaboration or attribution or acknowledgement of new authorship.This prohibition protected the trademark-like value of a work, thus protecting the commercial and reputational value of characters. 122 Lotz, "Beantwortung der Frage," col. 716.
Eighteenth-century commentators observed that this system benefited broader society as well. Owing to the freedom to create fan fiction, Lotz envisioned a more perfect German literature. 123 And describing imitators more generally, Krause identified an additional benefit for the consumer: the second-comer "makes his work either noticeably worse than the inventor; this boosts the latter, more than it harms him; -or better; in this regard, the public wins twiceover: better wares and better prices; -or about the same as the inventor, but cheaper; so the inventor must reduce the price, in order to prevent harm."
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In addition to balancing competing interests, the literary commons was, by all accounts, exceptionally egalitarian in terms of who was protected and who could use the common property of characters. There is no indication that male and female authors were treated differently. Nor were female and male readers subject to different rules when they appropriated fictional characters for use in fan fiction. Amateurs and professionals were also treated alike. Although the rules demanded a nuanced evaluation of fan fiction according to "Billigkeit" to determine whether pre-existing characters were properly used, the status of the creator was evidently immaterial. Instead, the focus seemed to have been on an individual text and the particular instance of fan fiction.
But it was precisely this advantage of the nuance-attuned rules that amounted to a clear disadvantage.
Particularly with regard to a character's portrayal, the standard was subjective and difficult to apply. As eighteenth-century commentators observed, the borders of Billigkeit are murky and cannot be determined by positive laws, but rather require a finer deliberation of the circumstances.
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The widely divergent opinions about Nicolai's appropriation of the character Sebaldus Nothanker highlight the administrative difficulties. Blanckenburg, for instance, objects that "the character of the later foregoing a positive-law solution as too blunt an instrument to deal with the intracacies and nuances of appropriating literary figures.
Reconceptualizing the literary commons as a regulated space, at least with regard to the appropriation of pre-existing fictional characters, complicates the traditional understanding the rise of intellectual property rights and challenges common conclusions drawn from that history. By focusing on piracy and the positive law and neglecting fan fiction and customary norms, legal and literary scholars have overlooked noteworthy eighteenth-century attitudes about authors' rights and literary creation.
An early reflection of moral rights?
According to the prevailing scholarly narrative, eighteenth-century German ideas about authors' moral rights were not reflected in practice until long after Kant's philosophy was introduced. Horst-Peter
Götting contends in his recent Geschichte des Persönlichkeitsrechts that the Kantian-inspired effort to create such a legal right was not achieved until the late nineteenth century with the work of Otto von Gierke (1841 Gierke ( -1921 . 129 Elaborating upon Kantian philosophy, von Gierke asserted that personality rights were distinct from and superior to author's economic rights, adding to German law the idea that an author could freely attain her artistic intentions. 130 As Peter Baldwin notes, "[i]mplicit here were attribution (claim to reputation) and integrity (achievement of goal)," thus reserving for the author the right to retain control over his works inneren Bestand as a form of personality rights, even if the author alienated his work. 131 Consequently, the late nineteenth century is typically identified as the first time that German thinkers began seriously formulating rules that would allow an author to fully alienate her work without abandoning all aesthetic control. 132 But this myopic focus on the positive law has led to a critical
oversight.
An early concept of moral rights was already reflected in the rules that governed the creation of fan fiction in the late-eighteenth century. Moral rights protect the author's right to "object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work." 133 "Billigkeit" and not the positive law -were alternatively motivated by a desire to balance the various competing interests in texts while acknowledging collaborative authorship and second uses.
Challenging copyright today
In the eighteenth century, as thinkers debated how to allocate and protect rights in literary works, turning to the positive law represented just one solution. The debate about fan fiction shows that eighteenthcentury thinkers embraced a variety of tools for regulating disputed literary practices. Existing studies of literary borrowing and descriptions of the "literary commons" mistakenly conflate the freedom of the commons with unrestricted use. Even scholars who study the history of fan fiction and its related practices have failed to take into account the customary norms that governed the creation of such texts.
Studying fan fiction adds new nuance to this history, compelling us to reconsider current claims based on the traditional narrative about the rise of intellectual property rights.
Critics like Lessig claim that the law today, by increasingly interfering with the use of creative works, has diverted wildly far from its eighteenth-century roots. 137 In Free Culture, Lessig bemoans the loss of our long tradition of "free culture." According to Lessig, this free culture aims to guarantee "that follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past." 138 But the norms governing fan fiction in the eighteenth-century did not free follow-on creators from the past. They rather bound them to it. The rules, after all, required fan fiction authors to portray appropriated characters consistently with their initial depiction. In this sense, the eighteenth-century literary commons does not represent the "free" culture Lessig suggests. Instead of supporting claims that we are losing a tradition of free culture by embracing increased moral rights, the history of intellectual property -examined from the perspective of fan fiction -actually suggests the opposite: that we might be returning to an eighteenthcentury culture of permissive but conditional borrowing, not departing from it. Contemporary copyright laws that increase protections for authors' moral rights may not be diverging from their roots, but may be incorporating historical customary practices, like the conditions imposed on the literary commons in the eighteenth-century.
Understanding the literary commons as a regulated space and customary law as an elected alternative to the positive law further undermines arguments made on both sides of the contemporary copyright debate. 139 Today, critics argue that copyright is either over-or under-protective of an author's rights and interests in her literary work. Legal theorists in support of a robust copyright argue that providing such protections incentivizes authorship, echoing claims already made in the eighteenth century, epitomized by Bahrdt. 140 To dispel this argument, proponents of copyright reform regularly draw conclusions from the history of intellectual property as it is traditionally reported. The German copyright historian Eckhard
Höffner, for instance, points to the prolific productivity of German writers in the eighteenth and Understanding fictional characters as special form of geistiges Stoff and a distinct type of Gemeingut also indicates that there are historical alternatives, besides the positive law, to safeguard authors' financial, artistic, and personality interests while still protecting downstream users and the public. Although in a different time and different context, this history shows that exclusive-use statutory protections were once considered an overly-blunt means of balancing the competing interests at stake. This history suggests that we might explore how to re-conceptualize characters in the current debate about fan fiction and consider alternative methods of regulating fan fiction. After all, the customary norms regulating fan fiction in the eighteenth century demonstrate that protecting moral rights and second users are not incompatible goals.
In this regard, fan fiction also provides a much-needed theoretical framework for understanding intellectual property and proprietary rights in literary works. Piper and Sachs note that the history of print and media is "most often written from either side of an uncrossable fence. Either print is a story of liberation and access OR it is a story of decline and fall. Either print arrests the word and stabilizes knowledge OR it proliferates writing and drowns out authority in a sea of competing voices and versions." 142 By allowing multiple authors to write a fictional character's story -but requiring that it remain consistent with a source author's vision -fan fiction and the norms governing its production show how both of these phenomena can be co-present.
Ultimately, studying the history of fan fiction adds new nuance to our understanding of the emergence of intellectual property rights in Germany. It identifies the long-overlooked tradition of "sharing and sharedness," as Piper puts it, and reveals norms that regulated this complex practice. 143 Conclusions about eighteenth-century writing practices and attitudes towards authors' rights cannot be based on the mistaken belief that literary borrowing was unregulated. The literary commons, it turns out, was less free and more complicated than scholarship has recognized. Copyright scholars and literary scholars of the eighteenth 142 Piper, A, and J Sachs. century must take into account these practices when making claims about concepts of authorship, the history of moral rights, and authors' proprietary interests in fictional texts.
